Laypeople as well as professionals, such as business managers and medical doctors, often use psychological heuristics. Psychological heuristics are models for making inferences that (1) rely heavily on core human capacities (such as recognition, recall, or imitation), (2) do not necessarily use all available information and process the information they use by simple computations (such as lexicographic rules or aspiration levels), and (3) are easy to understand, apply, and explain. Psychological heuristics are a simple alternative to optimization models (where the optimum of a mathematical function, that incorporates all available information, is computed). I review studies in business, medicine, and psychology, where computer simulations and mathematical analyses reveal conditions under which heuristics make better inferences than optimization, and vice versa. The conditions involve concepts that refer to (i) the structure of the problem, (ii) the resources of the decision maker, or (iii) the properties of the models. I discuss open problems in the theoretical study of the concepts. Finally, I organize the current results tentatively in a tree for helping decision analysts decide whether to suggest heuristics or optimization to decision makers. I conclude by arguing for a multi-method, multi-disciplinary approach to the theory and practice of inference-and decision-making.
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Introduction: Rethinking Heuristics
It is a well-known secret that laypeople and professionals often do not make decisions in the way prescribed by the mathematical models developed in operations research and management science. For example, whereas a widely advocated model for making decisions is multiattribute utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) , people who work "in the wild" such as military and fire officers, do not seem to use utilities or probabilities to decide (Klein and Calderwood 1991) . Lay investors do not use sophisticated models to diversify their assets, but often allocate an equal amount of wealth to each asset (Benartzi and Thaler 2001) . Medical doctors do not consult logistic regression for deciding whether or not patients should be admitted to the emergency room (Green and Mehr 1997) . Engineers do not experiment according to statistical theory, but use simple sequential procedures (Magee and Frey 2006) .
A blanket term for simple decision models that people use is heuristics. For a long time, heuristics were considered to be second best to standard decision-theoretic tools such as linear models, Bayesian networks, or classification and regression trees, and significant effort was put into steering professionals, and laypeople, away from the use of heuristics. Recently, however, evidence has been accumulating that heuristics can perform well in problems of inference such as judgment (Hogarth and Karelaia 2005a) , forecasting (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2009) , and categorization (Martignon, Katsikopoulos, and Woike 2008) : Heuristics have achieved competitive performance in applications in business (Astebro and Elhedhli 2006), medicine (Fischer et al. 2002) , and psychology (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, and Goldstein 1999) . These results bring up the possibility that it may be acceptable, or even desirable, to allow or instruct laypeople and professionals to use heuristics under the appropriate conditions. It is a good bet that more research is needed to fully investigate this possibility. Here, I summarize the existing empirical evidence, present a synthesis of the theoretical concepts and conditions that help explain it, and organize the results for the use of decision analysts. More specifically, the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I define the inference problems that will be considered here. I also define what is meant by psychological heuristics and give examples. These heuristics are a simple alternative to a class of models I call optimization models, of which I also give examples. In Section 3, I review the empirical evidence from computer simulation studies that compared the performance of heuristics and optimization. Theoretical concepts, that help explain the evidence and define conditions under which psychological heuristics and optimization models outperform each other, are discussed. In the next section, open problems in the theoretical study of the concepts are identified. In Section 5, I organize the results in a tree for helping decision analysts decide whether to suggest heuristics or optimization to decision makers. Section 6 concludes.
Psychological Heuristics and
Optimization Models
Heuristics
There are three interpretations of heuristics that are relevant here (for more discussion, see Groner, Groner, and Bischof 1983) . First, in operations research, heuristics refer to computationally simple models that allow ". . . quickly finding good feasible solutions" (Hillier and Lieberman 2001, p. 624) . The two other interpretations of heuristics come from psychology. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) focused on the experimental study of psychological processes that "in general, . . . are quite useful, but sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors" Kahneman 1974, p. 1124) , and proposed informal models (i.e., models that do not make precise quantitative predictions) of heuristics. Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC research group (1999) developed and tested quantitative models of heuristics that, they argued, ". . . when compared to standard benchmark strategies, . . . , can be faster, more frugal, and more accurate at the same time" (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999, p. 22) . Here, I conceptualize decision-making heuristics as a hybrid of these 3 three interpretations: As Tversky and Kahneman, and Gigerenzer et al. do, I consider heuristics that are not mere computational short-cuts but have a psychological basis; As Hillier and Lieberman, and Gigerenzer et al. do, I consider quantitative models of heuristics. More specifically, by psychological heuristics I mean models for making decisions, that:
(i) Rely heavily on core human capacities;
(ii) Do not necessarily use all available information, and process the information they use by simple computations;
(iii) Are easy to understand, apply, and explain.
For other definitions of heuristics in psychology, see Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) and Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (in press) . Requirements (i)-(iii) overlap with the properties of "fast and frugal heuristics" (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 75) , with some differences. For example, I introduce the requirements of usability and transparency of heuristics that are not in the Goldstein and Gigerenzer list. And, Goldstein and Gigerenzer ask that heuristics be descriptively adequate (i.e., model people's decisions), which is not among my requirements.
Based on (i)-(iii), guessing would qualify as a psychological heuristic. I do not see a problem with this conclusion. According to Richard Bellman, " In most situations, it would be just as useful to toss a coin if there are two possibilities, and people know just as much" (1978, p. 50) . Even if guessing were always a poor strategy, this article does not claim that psychological heuristics necessarily perform well. Parts of (i)-(iii) are underspecified (e.g., what is a "core" human capacity, which computations are "simple", when is a heuristic "easy" to understand?), but the following examples should clarify their meaning. I first consider a type of an inference problem that is often called a problem of judgment: The task is to judge which one of a number of objects has the higher value on a numerical criterion. For instance, objects could be companies and the criterion could be the value of their stock. Even though the correct answer is knowable, it is assumed that the decision-maker does not have access to it, but has to infer it. This assumption allows modeling interesting, and more challenging, problems of judgment where the correct answer will be available in the future, as when the criterion is the value of a company's stock five years from now. "If A is recognized and B is not recognized,
That is, if one object is recognized and another object is not, the recognized object is inferred to have the higher criterion value. For example, if the decision-maker has heard of Lufthansa but not Southwest Airlines, s/he can apply the heuristic and infer that Lufthansa has a higher stock price. The recognition heuristic satisfies (i)-(iii): First, it only requires peoples' capacity for recognition of names, voices, and faces. This capacity can be called core in the sense that it seems to be almost effortless for people to use it; for example, a human child can recognize faces better than currently available software (with the possible exception of new anti-terrorist technologies). Second, any information beyond recognition (e.g., Lufthansa is a German company) is ignored. Third, the recognition heuristic is defined by (1), which is a straightforward statement. If the decision-maker recognizes both Lufthansa and Southwest Airlines, the recognition heuristic cannot be used. The inference is then based on information on some characteristics of the objects that correlate, albeit imperfectly, with the criterion. For instance, if the criterion is stock price, relevant company characteristics may be the number of years that the company has been operating, whether the country of origin is a G-8 country or not, and so on. Such A family of simple attribute-based inference models for judgment is lexicographic heuristics (Fishburn 1974) :
What does (2) mean? Attributes are inspected one at a time until an attribute is found that has different values on the two objects; then, the object with the higher value on this attribute is inferred to have the higher criterion value. For example, suppose that a decision-maker orders the country-of-origin-in-G-8 attribute first and the number-of-years attribute second. The country-of-origin-in-G-8 attribute has the same value on Lufthansa and Southwest Airlines ("yes" that would be coded as 1), and Lufthansa has a higher value on the number-of-years attribute, so the decisionmaker would infer that Lufthansa has a higher stock price. The family of lexicographic heuristics is parameterized by the rule used to order attributes. For instance, in the take-the-best heuristic (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996) , attributes are ordered in descending order of their validity, v i :
According to (3), the validity of an attribute is the probability that the attribute has a higher value on the object that has the higher criterion value (given that the attribute has different values on the two objects). Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) postulated that people are able to calculate attribute validities based on the core capacity of monitoring frequencies of events, but this claim has been challenged (Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas 2008) . Rules for ordering attributes, simpler than using validity, have also been proposed, such as ordering attributes randomly (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996) . In any case, when the decision-maker makes an inference by using a lexicographic heuristic, s/he needs to retrieve attribute values from memory, one by one. Thus, lexicographic heuristics rely on peoples' capacity for what psychologists call recall, satisfying (i). I also believe that lexicographic heuristics satisfy (ii) and (iii) in the sense that the computations they require are simpler than the computations used in optimization; for example, lexicographic heuristics use only one attribute, j in (2), and avoid the integration of attribute values typically used in optimization models. Also, people's attribute orders and judgments can be, under some conditions, described by heuristics such as take-the-best, in the laboratory (Broeder and Newell 2008) , and in choices of consumer goods such as microwaves and apartments (Ford et al. 1989) . Lexicographic heuristics can also be applied to a generalization of the judgment problem, called categorization (or classification). In categorization problems, the task is to assign an object to one of many mutually exclusive categories; for example, to decide if a patient is at a high risk of having heart disease, or is not at a high risk. A judgment problem can be reformulated as a categorization problem where the pair (A, B) can be viewed as a single object and the possible categories where it could be assigned are
C(A) > C(B) and C(B) > C(A).
Lexicographic heuristics for categorization can be graphically represented as trees. A tree consists of the root node, on the tree's first level, and subsequent levels with one attribute processed at each level (see Figure 1 ). There are two types of nodes. First, a node may specify a question about the value of the object to be categorized on an attribute; the answer then leads to another node at the next level, and the process continues in this way. The root node is of that type. For nodes of the other type there is an exit; the object is categorized and the process stops. In sum, starting from the root node and answering a sequence of questions, an exit is reached and the object is categorized. For trees Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos: Psychological Heuristics for Making Inferences Decision Analysis 08(1), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS 5 to be easy for people to understand and apply they should not have too many levels, nodes, or attributes. For example, Figure 1 shows such a tree for categorizing a patient as being at a high or low risk of having ischemic heart disease (Green and Mehr 1997) .
Figure 1
A fast and frugal tree for categorizing patients as having a high or low risk of ischemic heart disease (for more details, see Green and Mehr 1997) .
A tree like the one in Figure 1 can be mathematically viewed as a lexicographic heuristic (Martignon et al. 2008) . Lexicographic heuristics for categorization are called fast and frugal trees (Martignon, Vitouch, Takezawa, and Forster 2003) : "A tree is fast and frugal if and only if it has at least one exit at each level". (4) According to (4), the tree of Figure 1 is fast and frugal. If a second question were asked for all patients with elevated ST segment, the tree would not have been fast and frugal. Fast and frugal trees are completely specified by rules for ordering attributes and for assigning exits to one of the possible categories. There are rules for doing so which are analogous to (3) (Martignon et al. 2008 (2002) used a fast and frugal tree for deciding whether children should be treated for pneumonia with antibiotics. A number of authors have argued that simple heuristics such as fast and frugal trees make the medical decision process more transparent and easier to understand and communicate to others (Pearson et al. 1994; Elwyn, Edwards, Eccles, and Rovner 2001; Reilly et al. 2002) . The next family of psychological heuristics I consider can be applied not only to judgment and categorization problems but also to another type of problems, forecasting, in which the task is to infer the criterion value of a single object. A forecasting problem can also be viewed as a categorization problem where each possible value of the criterion is a possible category (practically, this makes sense if the criterion is binary-or categorically-valued). The defining characteristic of this heuristic family is that it uses goals or aspiration levels (Simon 1955 (Simon , 1956 , t i : "Make a forecast about A if and only if
For example, a marketing manager of a company may forecast that a customer will not make any future purchases whenever the customer has not bought any of the company's products for one year or longer (in this case, there exists just one attribute). Wuebben and von Wangenheim (2008) review evidence for the use of such heuristics by professional decisionmakers. There are some inference problems and psychological heuristics I do not consider here. Social heuristics rely on core social capacities of people, such as imitation, which is unmatched among animal species. For instance, people often use the Do-what-the-majority-does heuristic (Laland 2001) : "If the majority of your peers display a behavior, engage in it as well". Such heuristics are very likely used in practice but I do not discuss them here because there has not 6 Decision Analysis 08(1), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS been much work on their performance. I also do not discuss psychological heuristics that apply to inference problems other than the ones considered here, such as geographic criminal profiling (Snook et al. 2005 ).
Optimization
I use the blanket term optimization models for decision-making models in which the minimum or maximum of a mathematical function that incorporates all available information about the decision problem is computed and used as a guide to making a decision (this working definition is inspired by Kimball 1958, p. 35 ). An example of an optimization model is multi-attribute utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1976 
That is, for each object a weighted sum of attribute values is computed and the object with the higher sum is inferred to have the higher criterion value (if the sums are equal, the inference is made randomly). In ordinary linear regression, weights are computed by minimizing the sum of squared errors between forecasted and true criterion values (linear models, such as regression, including sophisticated versions of it that select variables, can also be used for forecasting and categorization). My claim is that linear models violate (ii) because they always use all available information (the values of all attributes on both objects) and process this information by using both weighing and adding, which is more complex than the computing in lexicographic heuristics which does not require adding attribute values. I also believe that linear models violate (i): it is not clear which core capacities underlie the application of (6)-a possibility would be arithmetic but it is a learned and effortful activity, and (iii): in order to understand weighing and adding attributes, more quantitative sophistication is required than to understand inspecting attributes one at a time. Another family of optimization models for making judgments is that of Bayesian models (Domingos and Pazzani 1997) :
That is, the object that has, given all available information, the higher probability of having the higher criterion value, is inferred to have the higher criterion value. The probability in (7) is difficult to compute if the number of attributes is large or their interrelations are complicated (Cooper 1990 ). In practice, Bayesian models make simplifying assumptions about the interrelations among attributes. For example, naïve Bayes (Domingos and Pazzani 1997) assumes that attributes are conditionally independent given the criterion:
The last family of optimization models I consider are the so-called decision trees such as classification and regression trees (CART; Breiman, Friedman, Stone, and Olshen 1984) . They can be also applied to judgment and forecasting, but I focus on their application to categorization. CART are more complex versions of fast and frugal trees, where the rules for ordering attributes require a number of statistical tests, and it is not necessarily the case that a decision can be made at each level of the tree. 
Between Heuristics and
Optimization: Tallying There are some models that lie between the extremes of heuristics and optimization. For example, consider a simple linear model, tallying (also called unit-or equal-weights regression, Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Einhorn and Hogarth 1975) :
Even though it uses all available information, tallying can be seen as a psychological heuristic in that it amounts to simply adding attribute values and "is not demanding from a cognitive viewpoint" (Hogarth and Karelaia 2005a) . Dawes and Corrigan (1974) labeled tallying an "improper linear model" and DavisStober, Dana, and Budescu (in press) interpret this label as suggesting "heuristic judgment" and not a "result of any explicit optimization". Table 1 summarizes the material in this section. It includes the types of inference problems (judgment, categorization, and forecasting), and the heuristic and optimization models considered in this article.
Summary
An optimization model necessarily achieves the best possible performance only if the assumptions, on which it is based, are valid. This basic principle is often overlooked and optimization models are pronounced to be best even when it has not been established that their assumptions hold, as illustrated in one of Russell Ackoff's "fables" (1979, p. 97): A very large intrasystem distribution problem was modeled as a linear programming (LP) problem, and its optimal solution was derived; the argument offered for implementing this solution was that its performance was superior, according to the LP model, to that of another solution. It is necessary to empirically compare the performance of optimization models and alternatives such as psychological heuristics, and this is a major motivation for this article.
The Performance of Psychological Heuristics and Optimization Models: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Analysis
I first define the measures by which the performance of models is evaluated. The accuracy of a model is the proportion of problems in which it made the correct inference; for example, a correct judgment is that Lufthansa has a higher stock price than Southwest Airlines, and the categorization that a patient is at a high risk of having heart disease is correct if the patient subsequently suffered a heart attack. Most of the studies investigate accuracy. In a few studies, a second performance measure is investigated, the financial gain from a model's inferences. Furthermore, there are two types of accuracy. Fitting accuracy refers to the situation where the parameters of a model (e.g., attribute weights, order of attributes) are estimated using all data available. Predictive accuracy is often measured by cross-validation where the model parameters are estimated by using a subset of all data-called the training set-and the same parameters are applied to make decisions for the rest of the data-the test set; this process is repeated many times to average out random variation. Often, the training set is comprised of the attribute and criterion values of 50% of all objects. Predictive accuracy is a relevant measure of performance because it refers to decisions not yet made. The empirical evidence I review comes from computer simulation studies. By simulations I do not mean that the datasets discussed are fictitious (they are almost always real, unless otherwise stated), rather that the performance of models is not calculated by using closedform equations, but by simulating how an ideal agent would apply the models. I use only simulations because the goal of the review is to evaluate and understand the performance of models per se, excluding the human factor in applying the models. That is, I do not discuss (i) bootstrapping studies (Dawes and Corrigan 1974; Camerer 1981) 
1, (i)-(iii))
Lexicographic heuristics (e.g., take-the-best) (see (2) and (3)); Tallying (see (9)) Fast and frugal trees (see (4)); Tallying (see (9)) Heuristics with aspiration levels (see (5)); Tallying (see (9)) Optimization models (see Section 2.2) Optimization models (see Section 2.2) Linear models (e.g., regression) (see (6)); Decision trees (e.g., CART, see Breiman et al. 1984) Linear models (e.g., regression) (see (6)) Note: A, B are objects (e.g., companies); C(A), C(B) are objects' criterion values (e.g., stock price); and C 0 , C 1 categories where objects belong (e.g., in NY Stock Exchange). Table 1 A summary of the inference problems (judgment, categorization, forecasting) and models (psychological heuristics, optimization models) considered in this article.
work that compared the accuracy of people with linear models (Meehl 1954; Grove et al. 2000) ; or (iii) research on the accuracy of heuristics where each decision-maker has potentially different attribute values (e.g., recognition of stock options, Boyd 2001; Ortmann et al. 2008) . Furthermore, four classes of computer simulations and theoretical analyses are not reviewed here. First, I do not discuss work on the "adaptive decision-maker" (Thorngate 1980; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993) , or the "tyranny of choice" (Fasolo, McClelland, and Todd 2007 Smithson, 2010) , where less information can, under some conditions, lead to more accurate decisions. The less-ismore effect is related to the use of both psychological heuristics (i.e., recognition heuristic), and optimization models (e.g., linear models) and does not directly bear on comparing the two. There are also studies in which the performance of psychological heuristics is investigated but it is not compared to optimization models (McCammon and Haegeli 2007; Kattah et al. 2009) , and these are also not discussed. Finally, because of space limitations, I do not consider the large literature on group decisionmaking (Grofman and Owen 1986; Ben-Yashar and Nitzan 1997) . For studies of psychological heuristics for group decision making, see, for example, Hastie and Kameda (2005), Reimer and Hoffrage (2006) , and Reimer and Katsikopoulos (2004) . The material is organized around four themes, spread over eight sections. Each theme refers to one type of psychological heuristic. First, the empirical evidence on the accuracy of lexicographic heuristics and tallying is presented (Section 3.1); this evidence comes mostly from psychology. In the subsequent sections (3.2-3.5), I present a synthesis of theoretical concepts that 9 help explain the evidence and define conditions under which lexicographic heuristics and tallying achieve competitive accuracy or not. Second, the evidence on the relative accuracy of fast and frugal trees is discussed in Section 3.6; a lot of this evidence comes from medicine. In Section 3.7, a concept is introduced that plays a role for the accuracy of fast and frugal trees (and also of lexicographic heuristics and tallying). Third, evidence on the financial gain generated by psychological heuristics with aspiration levels is reviewed in Section 3.8; this research refers to business. Needless to say, the literature is large and omissions may have been made.
Lexicographic Heuristics and
Tallying: Empirical Evidence I first survey the results of comparisons among lexicographic heuristics, tallying, and linear models. In the seventies, Robyn Dawes and his colleagues (Dawes and Corrigan 1974; Dawes 1979) found that tallying had higher predictive accuracy than linear regression in two out of three forecasting problems. Dorans and Drasgow (1978) generated a number of artificial datasets so that they reflected characteristics of real forecasting problems and concluded that tallying overall outperformed a number of versions of regression. It has been and should continue to be emphasized, however, that there are conditions under which regression has higher predictive accuracy than tallying as, for example, when the size of the training set is large (Einhorn and Hogarth 1975) . Keren and Newman (1978) further highlighted such conditions. For a review of many related studies in psychometrics, and educational and personnel psychology, see Bobko, Roth, and Buster (2007) ; recent contributions are McGrath (2008) and Davis-Stober, Dana, and Budescu (2010) . Czerlinski et al. (1999) performed a simulation study with 20 datasets from the fields of biology, environmental science, economics, demography, health, psychology, sociology, and transportation. The inference problem was one of judgment and the criterion varied widely from men's and women's attractiveness, to cities' populations and homelessness rates, to obesity rates and mammals' sleep amounts, and so on. Continuous attributes were dichotomized by using the median. In fitting, regression was most accurate (77%), tallying scored 73%, and take-the-best 75%. In prediction, where the size of the training set was 50% of the whole dataset, take-the-best was most accurate (71%), and even tallying outperformed regression by 69% to 68%. When continuous attributes were not dichotomized, the predictive accuracy of take-the-best and regression was equal, 76%. More recently, in a series of papers, Hogarth and Karelaia (2005a , 2005b , 2006a , 2006b used mostly, though not exclusively, artificial datasets, and confirmed and extended these results: Take-the-best, tallying, and linear regression all could have superior and inferior performance. I now discuss comparisons of lexicographic heuristics and tallying with Bayesian models. Martignon and Hoffrage (2002) compared the predictive accuracy of take-the-best and tallying with two Bayesian models in the 20 datasets of Czerlinski et al., when the size of the training set equaled 50% of the whole dataset. The first model was naïve Bayes where the conditional independence assumption in (8) is made about the attributes, and the second one was a Bayesian network where attributes are assumed dependent in a relatively simple Markov sense. Recall that the predictive accuracy of take-thebest with continuous attributes was 76%, of take-the-best with binary attributes 71%, and of tallying (with binary attributes) 69%. The predictive accuracy of Naïve Bayes was 73% and of the Bayesian network 75% (both models used binary attributes). Katsikopoulos, Schooler, and Hertwig (in press ) also compared the predictive accuracy of takethe-best with continuous attributes and tallying with that of naïve Bayes with binary attributes. This study tested very small training set sizes, from 2 to 10 objects, that is, from 3% to 15% of all objects across 19 of the Czerlinski et al. (1999) datasets. It was found that, for 2 objects, tallying had the highest predictive accuracy and take-the-best was more accurate than naïve Bayes; for 3-10 objects, take-the-best had the Decision Analysis 08(1), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS highest accuracy, with naïve Bayes being more accurate than tallying. For 5-10 objects, the predictive accuracy of take-the-best exceeded that of naïve Bayes by more than 5%. DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007) ran a simulation study of models for deciding how to allocate one's wealth across assets in a financial portfolio (this task is similar to a categorization problem). They tested tallying (i.e., here meaning the allocation of an equal amount of wealth to each asset), against Markowitz's (1952) mean-variance optimization model (for details, see DeMiguel et al. 2007 DeMiguel et al. , pp. 1921 DeMiguel et al. -1922 , and 13 variants of the optimization model (some of them Bayesian), designed to deal with issues of statistical estimation. Tallying ignores the data on returns, whereas the optimization models use past returns to reallocate wealth. The authors used seven real portfolios (with data on the returns of the assets spanning form twenty to forty years), and one artificial portfolio. The performance of the models was evaluated according to three measures (Sharpe ratio, which is a risk-adjusted return; certaintyequivalent return; and turnover) in a test set, over many repetitions. The main result is that tallying was not consistently outperformed by any of the optimization models, in any of the three measures. On the other hand, the same authors have also developed more sophisticated Bayesian models that outperformed tallying (De Miguel et al. 2009 ). Finally, in the task of ordering articles according to their relevance for a given topic (e.g., eyewitness testimony), Lee, Loughlin, and Lundberg (2002) compared the performance of a variant of take-the-best with that of a Bayesian model. The take-the-best variant outperformed the Bayesian model, in particular when there were only a few relevant articles. In sum, there are three main findings of computer simulation studies comparing the accuracy of lexicographic heuristics and tallying with that of optimization tools such as linear and Bayesian models. First, when all evidence is taken into account, the accuracy of lexicographic heuristics, linear models, and simple Bayesian models is not that different. It should be emphasized, however, that even a small difference of, say, 1% in accuracy could translate to large differences in the performance of a business. Second, the accuracy of heuristics is surprisingly competitive to that of linear models and simple Bayesian models, especially in prediction. Third, all models can achieve relatively superior and inferior performance. In the next four paragraphs, I discuss theoretical concepts that help explain the results.
The Flat Maximum Effect
By definition, tallying is a linear model. It turns out that lexicographic heuristics, such as takethe-best, can also be viewed as linear models. Martignon and Hoffrage (2002) analytically showed that, when attributes are binary, a lexicographic heuristic makes judgments identical to those of a linear model where attributes have noncompensatory weights (for an earlier discussion of noncompensatoriness, see Einhorn, 1970) :
For example, it is easy to verify that a lexicographic heuristic that first inspects a 1 , then a 2 , and finally a 3 , makes judgments identical to those of the linear model 4a 1 + 2a 2 + a 3 . Katsikopoulos and Fasolo (2006) noticed that the commonly used ROC attribute weights (Srivastava, Connolly, and Beach 1995) satisfy (10) for up to four attributes; and they also extended the Martignon and Hoffrage result to judgments involving more than two objects. Martignon et al. (2008) proved that the result holds for categorization problems, and thus fast and frugal trees can also be viewed as linear models (a linear model for categorization assigns object A to category C 0 whenever i w i a i (A) > h, where h is a parameter of the model; in tallying, w i = 1). The noncompensatory-cue-weights result means that a lexicographic heuristic is a special case of a linear model. This implies that a lexicographic heuristic has at most equal accuracy with a linear model with unrestricted cue weights. I make a digression here to comment on this implication because it can generate confusion. Here is the apparent confusion: As we saw, there are empirical demonstrations, through computer simulations, where a lexicographic heuristic has outperformed an unrestricted linear model in terms of predictive accuracy. Does that mean that statements such as the noncompensatorycue-weights result refer to fitting accuracy? It depends on how you view the result. The noncompensatory-cue-weights result can be seen as referring only to fitting in the sense that the process of estimating parameters in a training set and applying the same parameters to the test set, is not part of the assumptions and derivation of the result. On the other hand, if cue weights are noncompensatory in the test set, then the result does refer to predictive accuracy. In the remainder, I will discuss analytical results on accuracy without making a distinction of whether they have to do with fitting or prediction. Now let us get back to the noncompensatorycue-weights result. Because of it, one way of investigating the accuracy of lexicographic heuristics is by studying the accuracy of the family of linear models. In fact, naïve Bayes can also be viewed as a linear model if the conditional independence assumption (8) 
Lovie and Lovie (1986) provided a detailed treatment of the effect and illustrated it for credit scoring and the prediction of sudden infant death. There is converging support for the flat maximum effect. In an early paper, Wilks (1938) analytically showed that, under reasonably general conditions, if the number of attributes is sufficiently large, most linear models make "almost identical forecasts".
More specifically, Einhorn and Hogarth (1975) showed that the minimum correlation between the forecasts of regression and tallying is an increasing function of the (assumed to be constant) correlation between attributes, and a decreasing function of the number of attributes. From this result, they were able to compute that this minimum correlation "is fairly high for most applied situations" (Einhorn and Hogarth 1975, p. 171) : For instance, it exceeds .6 if there are at most 10 attributes and the attribute correlation is at least .5. Ehrenberg (1982) considered the case of one attribute, and found that using a slope differing from the optimal regression slope plus or minus 30% yields only a 4% increase in unexplained error. Bobko et al. (2007) provide a recent review of related studies; a classic study on the relative accuracy of regression and tallying is Wainer (1976). The flat maximum effect is consistent with our empirical finding that, across a number of simulation studies, the differences in accuracy among take-the-best, tallying, linear regression, and naïve Bayes are, on the whole, not that large. Two theoretical concepts introduced in the next paragraph define conditions under which tallying, take-the-best, and other linear models are more accurate than each other.
3.3.
Noncompensatoriness and Cumulative Dominance Katsikopoulos and Martignon (2006) provided a necessary and sufficient condition for a lexicographic heuristic to achieve maximum accuracy among all possible models in judgment problems (this accuracy equals that of naïve Bayes). Assuming conditional independence (8) and that attributes are binary, the condition is that attributes have noncompensatory validities:
For example, if there are three attributes with v 1 = 0.8, v 2 = 0.67, and v 3 = 0.6, then (12) holds. Again assuming conditional independence (8) and binary attributes, there is also a necessary Decision Analysis 08(1), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS and sufficient condition for tallying to achieve maximum accuracy among all possible models in judgment (this accuracy equals that of naïve Bayes), that attributes have fully compensatory validities (Katsikopoulos and Martignon 2006) :
In analogy to the definition of fully compensatory attribute validities, we can also define fully compensatory attribute weights, when w i = w, for all i, as in (9). In a series of papers, Robin Hogarth and Natalia Karelaia (2005a , 2005b , 2006a , 2006b , analyzed further the relative accuracy of linear models (including tallying) and lexicographic heuristics (such as take-the-best) for judgment problems. There are three main differences between these studies and the studies by Laura Martignon and her colleagues (Martignon and Hoffrage 2002 , Katsikopoulos and Fasolo 2006 , Katsikopoulos and Martignon 2006 . First, Hogarth and Karelaia also considered continuous attributes (2005b, 2007) . Second, they looked into issues such as the correlations among attributes, or errors in the application of the models (2005a). Third, and most importantly, unlike Martignon and her colleagues, Hogarth and Karelaia modeled the decision environment, that is, the relationship between the criterion value of an object and the attribute values of the object. A simple version of the environment model is linear:
Does a linear model approximate decision environments well, or is a more complex model needed? Across 113 datasets from fields such as biology, chemistry, mechanical and manufacturing engineering, Li, Sudarsanam, and Frey (2006) found evidence for an extension of (14) with two-attribute interactions, C(A) = i β i a i (A) + i j>i β i,j a i (A)a j (A), but these datasets do not refer to decision-making. tested the two versions of the linear model, with and without interactions, in the 20 judgment problems of Czerlinski et al. (1999) . The parameters (attribute and interaction weights) were estimated by crossvalidation where the training set included 50% of all objects. The two versions fit equally well, in terms of (i) rank correlation between the order of objects according to their criterion values (as estimated by each version) and the order of the objects according to their real criterion values (Kendall's τ equaled .43), and (ii) the probability that the object with the highest criterion value (as estimated by each version) is indeed the object with the real highest criterion value (.61). Assuming an environment model makes the problem of judgment we have been studying similar to the problem of choice (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) . In fact, Hogarth and his colleagues have interpreted the environment model of (14) as a linear multi-attribute utility function. In some of their papers, Hogarth and Karelaia made additional mathematical assumptions to (14), as, for example, that attributes are normally distributed random variables (2005b, 2007) . They were then able to derive conditions for patterns of relative accuracy involving psychological heuristics and linear models. For example, Hogarth and Karelaia (2005b) showed that a lexicographic heuristic is at least as accurate as linear regression whenever the following condition holds (where a 1 is the attribute inspected first in the lexicographic heuristic, ρ C,a 1 is the correlation between a 1 and the criterion value C, and R 2 adj is an adjusted version of the correlation coefficient of linear regression; for details see Hogarth and Karelaia 2005b, p. 118) :
An informal interpretation of (15) is that the single attribute used by the lexicographic heuristic (because attributes are continuous, the first attribute inspected, a 1 , allows making a decision almost always) has a higher correlation with the criterion than does the sum of all attributes (weighed by the regression coefficients). In a sense, the attribute structure specified by (15) is noncompensatory, as is the attribute structure specified by (10) or (12). The validities of attributes, as defined in (3), 13 can also be interpreted as correlations (Martignon and Hoffrage 2002) . Furthermore, Hogarth and Karelaia showed that tallying is at least as accurate as linear regression whenever the following condition holds (where avg(a) is a dummy attribute whose value on an object is the average of all attribute values on that object):
Condition (16) can be interpreted as saying that there is little variability in attribute correlations (Hogarth and Karelaia 2005b, p. 119) , a condition similar to (9) or (13) that specify a fully compensatory attribute structure. In sum, even though it is an oversimplification, it can be said that the results of Hogarth and Karelaia converge with the results of Martignon and her colleagues on the theoretical concepts used to explain and define the conditions for competitive accuracy of psychological heuristics. These concepts are noncompensatory attribute structures for lexicographic heuristics, and fully compensatory attribute structures for tallying. We do not have analytical results on how inferior the accuracy is of lexicographic heuristics and tallying when these conditions are not satisfied; all that is known is that there exist other models that outperform heuristics and tallying. There is another condition that guarantees competitive accuracy for lexicographic heuristics and tallying. Baucells, Carasco, and Hogarth (2008) showed that, assuming a linear environment model (14), a lexicographic heuristic and tallying (and some linear models) achieve maximum accuracy across all possible models in a judgment problem where two or more objects are compared, if the condition of cumulative dominance (Kirkwood & Sarin, 1985) holds:
There exists A so that for all B:
For example, for two objects, A and B, such that a 1 (A) = 1, a 2 (A) = 0, a 3 (A) = 1, and a 1 (B) = 0, a 2 (B) = 1, a 3 (B) = 1, A cumulatively dominates B. The lexicographic heuristic that inspects attributes in the order a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 , would judge A as having the highest criterion value, and this is correct for the linear environment model C(A) = 5a 1 (A) + 4a 2 (A) + 3a 3 (A). It can be shown that the Baucells et al. result also holds for linear environment models with attribute interactions (Li et al., 2006) if attributes are binary . Baucells et al. (2008) showed that cumulative dominance is relatively common. For example, given two objects with three attributes each, one object cumulatively dominates the other in 97% of all possible distributions of binary attributes across objects. The probability that cumulative dominance holds remains high when more objects and attributes are added and assumptions are made about the attributes (e.g., they are independent, identically distributed, Bernoulli random variables). The high probability of cumulative dominance leads to a low expected value loss for lexicographic heuristics . On the other hand, noncompensatoriness seems to be less frequently satisfied. For example, Hogarth and Karelaia (2005a) pointed out that, in principle, attribute weights are seldom noncompensatory, and Katsikopoulos and Martignon (2006) empirically found that attribute validities were noncompensatory in three of the 20 datasets of Czerlinski et al. (1999) . The two concepts share an important commonality. They both refer to the structure of the inference problem: Cumulative dominance refers to structure in the space of attribute value, and noncompensatoriness refers to structure in the space of attribute goodness. Furthermore, both concepts express that one thing is, in a way, "superior" to other things of the same kind (objects in the case of cumulative dominance; attributes in the case of noncompensatoriness).
Linear Cognitive Ability
Assuming that the attributes and the criterion are independent, identically distributed, normal random variables, Hogarth and Karelaia (2007) introduced a measure that defines a necessary and sufficient condition for the linear model Decision Analysis 08(1), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS with unrestricted weights to be more accurate than the linear model with noncompensatory weights (i.e., a lexicographic heuristic). This measure assumes that the decision environment is linear, as in (14) . It refers to the decisionmaker, characterizing his/her cognitive ability of applying a linear model in a linear environment. Assume that the decision-maker's forecasts are best (but not necessarily perfectly) described by a linear model with weights w i , in a linear environment with "true" weights β i . This decisionmaker's linear cognitive ability is defined as follows (G is the correlation, across all objects A, between i β i a i (A)and i w i a i (A); R s is the correlation, across all objects, between i w i a i (A) and the criterion values that the decision-maker actually forecasts):
Hogarth and Karelaia (2007) showed that the unrestricted linear model is more accurate than a lexicographic heuristic whenever the linear cognitive ability of the decision-maker exceeds a critical value. The concepts of flat maximum, noncompensatory and fully compensatory structures, cumulative dominance, and linear cognitive ability provide insights into regions of superior accuracy of heuristics or optimization. As Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) point out, however, this kind of concept does not incorporate the process of sampling that is critically involved in making predictions for the future. The next concept refers to sampling and prediction.
The Bias-Variance Dilemma
The bias-variance dilemma is an application of sampling theory to the evaluation of models in tasks of inference such as forecasting, judgment, and categorization. For a detailed treatment, see Geman, Bienenstock, and Doursat (1992) . Informally, the idea is that the predictive accuracy of a family of models can be decomposed as follows:
Prediction error = (Bias) 2 + variance + irreducible error. (19) As an example, for the linear model family tested on 50% of all objects in a forecasting problem, bias corresponds to the average (across all sets of attribute weights estimated from all training sets with 50% of all objects) of the deviation between forecasted and true criterion values. Variance corresponds to the variability of the forecasted criterion value. Irreducible error is, for a given decision to be made, constant across all models. According to (19), a family of models may be more predictively accurate than another family because it has comparatively low bias or because it has comparatively low variance. Such tradeoffs between bias and variance have been discussed in the context of regression models (for references, see Davis-Stober et al, in press). Holte (1993) has suggested that simple heuristics for categorization might have relatively high predictive accuracy because they have relatively low variance. Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) developed Holte's conjecture for lexicographic heuristics, such as take-the-best, and provided illustrations consistent with it. used a computationally efficient version of (19), suggested by Lee (2004) , and derived analytically a number of conditions for the relative predictive accuracy of a lexicographic heuristic and the linear model with unrestricted weights; for example, across all inference problems with three binary attributes, these models have equal predictive accuracy as measured by the socalled minimum description length (Lee, 2004) . Davis-Stober et al. (in press) assumed continuous attributes and a linear environment model, and showed analytically that the expectation (over the training set) of the sum of squared errors between the "true" weights and the weights of a linear model is optimized, in a mini-max sense, by a linear model that uses a single attribute, as a lexicographic heuristic would. Based on this result, Davis-Stober et al. (2010) derived optimality conditions for the 15 single-attribute model, that differ from conditions on correlations identified elsewhere (e.g., Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005b ).
Fast and Frugal Trees: Empirical
Evidence Brighton (2006) compared the predictive accuracy of a fast and frugal tree with CART (Breiman et al. 1984 ) and another popular decision tree, C4.5 (Quinlan 1990) , which can also be viewed as an optimization model. He used eight of the problems of Czerlinski et al. (1999) , and, in each problem, varied the size of the training set. In four of the problems, the fast and frugal tree outperformed the decision trees for all training set sizes. In the other four problems, the highest predictive accuracy was achieved by different models for different training set sizes: When the size of the training set was relatively small, the fast and frugal tree tended to do best, whereas when the size of the training set was larger, CART and C4.5 tended to do best. The latter pattern of results was also obtained by Juslin and Persson (2002) and Chater, Oaksford, Nakisa, and Redington (2003) , although these authors tested only one decision problem (which was not one of the eight problems tested by Brighton). Brighton (2006) also replicated his results by using minimum description length as a measure of predictive accuracy. Martignon et al. (2008) compared two fast and frugal trees (that differed on the rules used for ordering attributes and for assigning, at each tree level, the exit to one category), with CART and logistic regression (the analogue of linear regression for categorization problems; see Long et al, 1993) . They used 30 categorization problems from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository, of which 11 were medical decision problems. For each problem, three sizes of the training set were tested: 90%, 50%, and 15% of all objects. The results were similar to those of Brighton (2006): When the training set size was large, either CART or logistic regression outperformed both fast and frugal trees, and when the training set size was small, a fast and frugal tree outperformed both CART and logistic regression. For example, in the 11 medical problems, when the training set included 90% of the objects, logistic regression outperformed both fast and frugal trees (79% vs. 76% and 74%); and when the training set included 15% of the objects, a fast and frugal tree scored 74%, whereas the other fast and frugal tree scored 72%, which was equal to the accuracy of CART and logistic regression. Similar results were obtained by Fernandez, Katsikopoulos, and Shubitizde (2010) . They applied fast and frugal trees and CART to the problem of detecting unexploded ordnance (i.e., munitions used in war or military practice). In cross-validation, when the training set had up to 10 (out of a total of 216) objects, fast and frugal trees had superior accuracy, whereas CART was more accurate when the training set had more than 10 objects. The next two problems refer to fitting. Green and Mehr (1997) compared the performance of the fast and frugal tree in Figure 1 to logistic regression. Here, accuracy was separated into two measures: hit rate and correct-rejection rate. The hit rate of a model equals the proportion of patients who eventually suffered a heart attack and were (correctly) assigned to the emergency care unit. The correct-rejection rate of a model equals the proportion of patients who did not suffer a heart attack and were (correctly) assigned to a regular nursing bed. Unaided physicians followed a very defensive categorization rule, sending 90% of all patients to the emergency care unit. As a consequence, whereas the hit rate was about 90%, the correctrejection rate was close to 0%. The fast and frugal tree produced a hit rate of 100%, while also increasing the correct-rejection rate to about 50%. Logistic regression had a free parameter that allowed it to make tradeoffs between hit-and correct-rejection rates, and it produced eight pairs of rates. All of these pairs had a lower hit rate than that of the fast and frugal tree, and the correct-rejection rate was higher in five of the eight pairs. Fischer et al. (2002) designed a fast and frugal tree (with just two attributes) for deciding whether or not to prescribe macrolide antibiotics to children suspected of having community-acquired pneumonia. Logistic Decision Analysis 08(1), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS regression achieved a hit rate of 75% and the fast and frugal tree achieved 72%.
Scarce Information
In sum, the computer simulations reviewed in Section 3.6 found that fast and frugal trees tend to have higher predictive accuracy than CART and logistic regression when the training set size was relatively small. On the other hand, the opposite pattern tended to occur when the size of the training set was relatively large. Recall, from Section 3.1, that take-the-best (and, in some cases, tallying) also had higher predictive accuracy than simple Bayesian models when there was not much information available for training the models. Based on a mathematical analysis, DeMiguel et al. (2007) concluded that, in their study of financial investment, a reason for the good performance of tallying is that the information necessary for estimating reliably the parameters of the optimization models is not available in training sets with few objects. Martignon and Hoffrage (2002) defined a decision-maker as having scarce information when the number of (binary) attributes s/he has access to is smaller than the base-2-logarithm of the number of objects in the decision problem. They then showed that, in the majority of problems with not so many objects (less than 27), takethe-best was more accurate than tallying. If there are fewer than five attributes, it can be shown that the linear model with unrestricted attribute weights rarely has higher accuracy than a lexicographic heuristic . In sum, scarce information may refer to few objects, few attributes, or few attributes per object. In any case, it tends to favor heuristics, as summarized informally below: "When information is scarce, psychological heuristics tend to have higher predictive accuracy than optimization models, and the opposite tends to be true when information is not scarce. The reason for this pattern seems to have to do with parameter estimation". (20) 3.8. Heuristics with Aspiration Levels:
Empirical Evidence Astebro and Elhedhli (2006) considered the forecasting of commercial success of inventions submitted for review to the Canadian Investment Assistance Program (CIAP). They used 561 submissions to CIAP (from 1989 to 1994), 62 of which were after-the-fact considered as commercial successes and 499 of which were after-the-fact considered failures, based on whether they generated sales revenue or not. All submissions had 37 attributes (e.g., environmental impact, price, safety, technical feasibility). The authors classified each attribute as positive (if submissions with this attribute were more likely to be successes) or negative (otherwise). After having interviewed experienced CIAP reviewers, Astebro and Elhedhli came up with a heuristic that uses aspiration levels:
"Forecast that an invention will become a commercial success if and only if the number of positive attributes exceeds t and the number of negative attributes does not exceed s, where t, s ≥ 0."
In addition to the aspiration levels t and s, the heuristic has a third parameter, which is the number n of attributes considered. Astebro and Elhedhli (2006) used a single training set (the 383 submissions to CIAP from 1989 to 1992, which included 39 successes) and estimated the parameters of the heuristic. In the test set, the remaining 178 submissions to CIAP from 1992 to 1994, the accuracy of the heuristic with n = 21, t = 5, and s = 2, equaled 86%, which was equal to that of a log-linear regression. Astebro and Elhedhli pointed out that the heuristic predicted correctly more successes than did the regression, which is financially important because the revenue to CIAP from submissions of successes is estimated to be 10 times higher than the revenue from failures. Wuebben and von Wangenheim (2008) studied the prediction of future purchasing behavior of past customers. They considered a number of related decision problems of which I focus on one-how to forecast if a past customer will continue buying from the firm. This is a relevant decision because it makes sense to spend marketing effort (e.g., mailing of new catalogs or special deals) only on such active customers. The authors used data from three firms (airline, apparel, and music). For each firm, the purchasing behavior of at least 2,330 customers for at least 1.5 years was available. Wuebben and von Wangenheim proposed the following aspirationlevel-based heuristic:
"Forecast that a past customer will continue buying from the firm if and only if s/he has made at least one purchase during the most recent t months".
For the airline and apparel firms, interviews with managers revealed that they were using t = 9; for the music firm, the authors set t at 6 months. Thus, the parameter of the heuristic was fixed and did not have to be estimated in a training set. The parameters of an alternative optimization model (Ehrenberg 1988), were estimated by using the purchasing behavior for the first half of the available time. The heuristic achieved higher accuracy than optimization in the airline (77% vs. 74%) and apparel firms (83% vs. 75%), and equal accuracy in the music firm (77%). Table 2 summarizes the main empirical results on the comparison of the performance of heuristics and optimization, and theoretical concepts that help explain the results.
Open Theoretical Problems
The concepts in Table 2 can be classified into three categories. First, noncompensatoriness and cumulative dominance refer to the structure of the problem (objects, their criterion values, their attributes, and the values of the attributes). Second, scarce information and linear cognitive ability refer to the resources and skills of the decision maker. Finally, the flat maximum effect and the bias-variance dilemma refer to the properties of models. These six concepts are the primitives of the emerging theory of how to make inferences. The main challenge of this theory is to relate the concepts. It could, of course, be asked if some of these concepts belong to more than one category (for example, scarce information could be also viewed as a property of the structure of the problem). But other questions may be more useful, as, for example, (i) how are concepts related causally, and (ii) how do concepts in different categories interact with each other to determine the relative performance of models. Instances of question (i) are if, and under what conditions, does scarce information imply noncompensatoriness, and which values of linear cognitive ability make the flat maximum effect more prevalent. Question (ii) is an explication of Herbert Simon's (1955 Simon's ( , 1956 ) key idea that to understand decision-making we need to analyze the interaction between the organism and its environment; an example of it is if heuristics perform competitively when information is scarce and variance of predictions is relatively constant across models.
Suggesting Heuristics or Optimization? A Tree for Decision Analysts
Even though decision analysis has been theoretically based on optimization (Howard 1966; Fishburn 1989) , it has also been acknowledged that its practice may need to incorporate heuristics as well: In the words of Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky (1988) : ". . . if it is too horrendously complicated to constructively formulate such an objective function, then the prescriber's operational advice might be better organized by a satisficing heuristic" (p. 19). The question is of course when should the decision analyst suggest the use of optimization to decision makers, and when should s/he suggest heuristics. In Figure 2, I tentatively organize the current results in the form of a tree that can help decision analysts make suggestions. In the tree of Figure 2 , the first question is whether the available information is scarce or not. I chose this question for beginning the analysis for two reasons. First, it seems easier to explain the concept of scarce information rather than other candidate concepts such as linear cognitive ability. Second, the effect of scarce information on the relative performance of heuristics and optimization seems to Decision Analysis 08(1), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS
Task
Empirical result Theoretical concept Overall, small differences in accuracy among take-the-best, tallying, linear regression, and naïve Bayes (see Section 3.1)
Flat maximum effect (see Section 3.2) Judgment: Does one object have a higher criterion value than another object?
Linear regression and naïve Bayes can have higher accuracy than take-the-best and tallying (see Section 3.1) Compensatoriness (not full) (see Section 3.3) and high linear cognitive ability (see Section 3.4) Take-the-best and tallying can have higher predictive accuracy than linear regression and naïve Bayes, and vice versa (see Section 3.1) Bias-variance dilemma (see Section 3.5) Categorization: To which category does an object belong?
Fast and frugal trees can have higher accuracy than CART and logistic regression, and vice versa (see Section 3.6) Scarce information (see Section 3.7) Table 2 A summary of the empirical results (from computer simulations) reviewed and the theoretical concepts (from mathematical analyses) for them.
be reliable and strong (see Sections 3.6 and 3.7). Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (in press) put special emphasis on a similar concept, the socalled large worlds where ". . . part of the relevant information is unknown or has to be estimated from small samples". Large worlds were discussed by L. J. Savage (1954) as a situation where optimization may not yield the best possible results (Binmore 2009 , also agrees with this claim). The second question in the tree of Figure 2 is if the environment is linear. This is so because some current results make this assumption, those on cumulative dominance and linear cognitive ability. These two results are arguably the most applicable because other work assumes very strong conditions (noncompensatoriness) or has not yet produced many concrete results (bias-variance dilemma). If the environment is not linear, then it seems that the decision analyst does not have many results to draw from, and the best course may be to engage the decision maker in an informative and open discussion of heuristics and optimization. If the environment is linear, then it comes down to whether the linear cognitive ability result can be applied or not: If it can, it should; if it cannot, a reasonable course for the decision analyst is to suggest that either linear models or lexicographic heuristics may be used (because of the flat-maximum-and cumulativedominance results).
Summary and Concluding Remarks
More than fifty years ago, George Kimball wrote: ". . . there has arisen a temptation to claim that operations research is the study of the best way to control an operation" (1958, p. 35 , emphasis in the original). He also declared that (emphasis added) "In my experience when a moderately good solution to a problem has been found, it is seldom worthwhile to spend much time trying to convert this into the 'best' solution". The idea of not pursuing optimization indiscriminately is a familiar theme (Simon, 1955; Ackoff, 1979) . It does, of course, not mean that optimization models are ineffective. But it necessitates that they are tested empirically Figure 2 The current results tentatively organized in a tree for helping decision analysts decide whether to suggest heuristics or optimization to decision makers.
and analyzed theoretically against alternatives.
In fact, such work has been carried out, but it seems to not yet have penetrated the mainstream of model development and testing in operations research and management science. This kind of resistance, across the sciences of decision-making, is documented and discussed by Hogarth (in press). A major motivation for this article was to survey research that compared the performance of optimization models and an alternative, psychological heuristics. These heuristics are more than mere computational shortcuts and have a psychological basis in things that people can do almost effortlessly (e.g., recognize, recall, imitate). The mathematical basis of heuristics is simple techniques such as lexicographic algorithms and aspiration levels. Psychological heuristics have regions of superior performance to optimization models, especially when the task is to make inferences about the future. Note that these results do not necessarily contradict the conclusions of research that found that human decision-makers are outperformed by optimization models such as linear models (Meehl, 1954; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989) . This is so for two reasons (Katsikopoulos, Pachur, Machery, & Wallin, 2008) : First, it is not clear that the human decision-makers tested in that research used psychological heuristics, as defined here; second, even if such heuristics were used, it may be that errors were made in their application. Of course, optimization models outperform psychological heuristics in other regions of the decision space. It follows that it is necessary to develop a theory that allows decision-makers to a-priori anticipate under which conditions they should use optimization and under which conditions they should employ heuristics (for more on this idea, see Hogarth and Karelaia 2006a) . A contribution of this article is to gather and classify the so-far known elements of the theory and practice, that come from a number of disciplines, often outside operations research and management science. In sum, an important lesson from comparing the performance of optimization and heuristics is that the theory and practice of inference-and decision-making can only progress if researchers apply a multi-method, multi-disciplinary approach. As it has been repeatedly pointed out (March, 1978; Kleinmuntz, 1990; Gigerenzer, 2001; Hammond, 2007) , no model is best under all conditions, and, as we saw here, ideas from all disciplines that relate to making decisions are needed to build a flexible and effective repertoire of models.
